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S.: No-Term Oil and Gas Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities
WEST V IGINIA LAW QUARTEBLY

passed on severance of the reversion would not be overthrown.
This rule as to a "presumption" that the royalty passes subject
to be overcome by the "equity and justice" gives no definite rule
of law by which lawyers and the public generally may be guided.
Apparently no one could be reasonably sure of his rights in a particular case until suit was brought and the case was decided by the
court. The merit of the rule suggested by the dissenting opinion
is that it is a definite rule of law which will do substantial justieg
in a great majority of the cases and upon which lawyers and the
public generally can rely. It is submitted that the doctrine of the
dissenting opinion is in accord with legal principles, is in accord
with the weight of authority and is preferable from the standpoint
of general justice and welfare.
-J. W. S.

NO-TERM OIL AND GAS LEAsEs AND THE RULE AGAINST PEWthe recent case of Johnson v. Armstrong' the Su-

PETUITIES.-In

preme Court of Appeals has again decided that a no-term oil and
gas lease does not violate the rule against perpetuities. The only
cases cited by the court in support of its decision on this point in
which any question as to the rule against perpetuities was raised
are Thaw v. Gaffney 2 and Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co.3 In Thaw v.
Gaffney it was held that an option in a lessee to renew the lease.
perpetually is not void as being within the rule against perpetuities. This is in accord with the great weight of authority and has
been termed an exception to the rule against perpetuities. A noterm oil and gas lease such as involved in Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co.
and Johnson v. Armstrong gives to the lessee what is in effect an
option to renew perpetually, if we disregard for the present the
question, discussed hereafter, as to whether there is an implied condition that the lessee explore for oil and gas. In so far as this
right to renew the lease perpetually is concerned the above eases are
correct. However, as was pointed out in a recent article in this
periodical,5 a no-term oil and gas lease violates the rule against
perpetuities for another reason which it seems has never been
'94 S. E. 753 (W. Va. 1918).
'75 W. Va. 229, 83 S. E. 983 (1914).
378 W. Va. 329, 58 S. E. 1075 (1916).
'See GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPnTDITIEs, 3 ed., 1§230, 230a, 230aa. See also
cases collected In 25 W. VA. L. QUART. 36, note 24.
"Oil and Gas Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 25 W. V4. L. QuART.
36. 37.
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;called to the attention of the court. It contains an almost perfect
analogy" to an option to purchase realty which may be exercised
too remotely, and is therefore within the8 rule laid down in Starciler
7
Bros. v. Duty and WoodalZ v. Bruen.
As soon as the ordinary oil and gas lease is executed, the lessee
gets two interests in the land, if we accept the construction put
upon the instruments by the courts. First, he gets a vested right
to enter on the land and search for oil and gas.9 Second, he gets
an estate either in the oil and gas, or in the land, contingent upon
his discovering oil or gas in accordance with the provisions of the
lease. 10 In a no-term lease this contingent estate may vest beyond
the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuities and therefore should be void.
The conclusion of the court in Johnson v. Armstrong that the
lease is not within the rule against perpetuities can be justified, if,
as the court holds, the lessor had a right, at the end of any three
months' period, to give the lessee notice of intent to forfeit the
lease unless the lessee should drill a well within a reasonable time.
If there was such a right in the lessor he could haVe terminated the
lease within a comparatively short time unless the lessee actually
discovered oil or gas, and therefore, there could be no objection on
the ground that the estate above mentioned might vest too remotely.
6It has been suggested that one having an option to purchase land may in some
cases be considered as the substantial owner of the property or as having dominus
See
of the property and, therefore, what amounts to a present interest therein.
KAlxS, FUTUnE I.TEnri.TS. 260. But this cannot be said where the estate is subject
to a condition precedent which imposes a considerable burden on the optionee. In
the case of a no-term oil and gas lease there is not only great expense in drilling a
-well but the vesting of the estate is contingent on finding oil or gas. The lessee
may fail to find either of the minerals because they are not present or because,
'though present, the well did not happen to tap the oil or gas bearing strata. Hence
the lessee cannot be said to have domnus of the estate.
761 W. Va. 373, 56 S. E. 527 (1907).
'76 W. Va. 193, 85 S. D. 170 (1915).
'It has been frequently stated that an oil and gas lessee gets no vested estate in
the land until he discovers oil or gas. This is clearly erroneous. As soon as the
lease Is executed there passes to the lessee an exclusive right, for a period, to enter
on the land and search for oil and gas. This right being incorporeal cannot be
properly protected in a court of law if the lessee is out of possession, but a court of
equity will enforce the right either against the lessor and his privies or against
strangers. See Lockwood v. Carter Oil Co., 73 W. Va. 175, 80 S. E. 814 (1913) ;
-Smith v. Root, 66 W. Va. 633, 66 S. E. 1005 (1910) ; Eastern Oil Co. u. Coulehan,
If a court of equity will protect this right of
65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909).
exploration by injunction or by specific performance, it is necessarily a vested
estate in land.
10This is too well established to require a citation of authorities. A number of
cases to this effect are cited in Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89
. E. 12 (1916).
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This right of the lessor, while not so designated, must be an implied condition. According to the court the lessee must, on demand
of the lessor, begin to drill.a well within a reasonable time after the
termination of the period for which the lessor has accepted delay
rentals. It is respectfully submitted that no such condition ought
to be implied." Each of the leases involved in this ease was given
on a consideration of one dollar and each contained a provision as
follows:
"In case no well is completed within three months, then
this grant shall become null and void, unless the second party
pay to the first party thirty-four dollars in advance for each
three months thereafter such completion is delayed."
This expressly gives the lessee an option at the end of each three
months' period to pay the delay rental and thus extend the time
for drilling a well. It is not intimated that this option is invalid
for any reason or that there is not adequate consideration for it.
If invalid the result would be that the lessor would have an immediate right to forfeit the lease as soon as any period expired for
which delay rental had been accepted. If the option is valid the
implied condition under which the lessee may be compelled to drill
a well or forfeit the lease is inconsistent with the intent of the
parties as expressed in the language of the lease. In the carefully
considered case of Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co.,' 2 it was said
that no covenant to explore for oil and gas can be implied, where
the lease gives the lessee the option to drill a well or to pay a sum
periodically in lieu thereof, and that a condition might be implied
only in case the oil and gas were being drained from the premises."
"Apparently the first case in this state in which it was said that such a condition
would be implied was Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., supra. The authority relied upon
was Venedocia Oil & Gas Co. v. Robinson, 71 0. St. 392, 73 N. E. 222 (1905), but
this case contains nothing but a rather weak dictum which tends to support the
proposition for which it is cited, and two quotations which purport to be taken from
it are not to be found there. The writer has been unable to discover the source of
these quotations but it is highly improbable that they are taken from any opinion
of the Supreme Court of Ohio. It is unfortunate that such a disturbing elementshould have been injected into the law of this state at a time when the body of the.
law relating to oil and gas leases seemed to be in a fair way to be quite satisfactorilysettled.
1278 W. Va. 433, 89 S. E. 12 (1916).
"To the effect that if express provisions as to forfeiture are set out In the lease
no new and inconsistent grounds can be implied, see Kachelmacher V. Laird, 92 O
St. 324, 110 N. E. 933 (1915) ; Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 0. St. 118, 48 N. B. 502'
(1897) ; Poe e,. Ulrey, 233 I1. 56, 84 N. B. 46 (1908) ; Rose V. Lanyon Zinc Co., 68.
Kan. 126, 74 Pac. 625 (1903).
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The latter exception was made because the court considered that it
could not have been the intent of the parties that the oil and gas
be removed from the land except through wells on the premises,
and a condition might properly be implied which would require
the lessee to protect the leasehold from drainage on penalty of forfeiting the lease. This is quite different from implying a condition which destroys the express provisions of the lease as is the
case in Johnson v. Armstrong. If the lessor is willing to accept
money in lieu of development why assist him to break his contract
so long as the oil and gas remains undisturbed beneath his land?
If the lease was obtained through fraud, why not cancel the lease
for fraud? Because the lessor has made a bad bargain should a
court make a better one for him by resorting to implications contrary to the express language of the contract? Johnson v. Armstrong does not even appear to be a case where there would have
been any particular injustice to the lessor. It is submitted that
the language of the parties in an oil and gas lease ought to be
given its ordinary and usual meaning and that any other policy
leads to confusion and uncertainty as to important property interests. The implied condition above mentioned logically applies
to every oil and gas lease which purports to give the lessee an
option to drill or pay delay rentals. It is submitted that it is
unwise thus to upset what have been considered for a long time
as settled principles of the law of real property.
-J. W. S.

RiGlTS
HAS No

IN A LIFE INSURANCE

PoIaCY

OF A BENEFICLRY WHO

is held that one may not in his
own name and at his own expense procure insurance for his own
benefit on the life of another without having what is known as an
insurable interest in the life.' On the other hand, it is held by a
heavy preponderance of authority that one who procures insurance on his own life on his own initiative and at his own expense
may name as beneficiary one who has no insurable interest in the
INSURABLE INTERST.-It

2Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Volger, 89 Ind. 572, 46 Am. Rep. 185; Griffens V.
Equitable Assurance Soc., 119 Ky. 856, 84 S. W. 1164 (1905); Ruse v. Insurance
Co., 23 N. Y. 516 (1861) ; Burbage v. Windley, 109 N. C. 361, 12 S. E. 839, 12 L.
R. A. 409 (1891); Crismond v. Jones, 117 Va. 34, 37, 83 S. E. 1045 (1915)
(dictum).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol25/iss3/6

4

